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Since Feldstein (1999), the most widely used method of calculating the excess burden of income taxation
is to estimate the effect of tax rates on reported taxable income. This paper reevaluates the taxable
income elasticity as a measure of excess burden when individuals can evade or avoid taxes. In many
cases, part of the cost of evasion and avoidance reflects a transfer to another agent in the economy.
I show that in such situations, excess burden depends on a weighted average of the taxable income
and total earned income elasticities, with the weight determined by the marginal resource cost of sheltering
income from taxation. This generalized formula implies that the efficiency cost of taxing high income









In an in￿ uential pair of papers, Feldstein (1995, 1999) showed that the excess burden of income
taxation can be calculated by estimating the e⁄ect of taxation on reported taxable income ￿the
￿taxable income elasticity.￿ Feldstein￿ s taxable income approach has since become the central
focus of the literature on taxation and labor supply because of its elegance and practicality. The
approach is elegant because one does not have to account for the various channels through which
taxation might impact individual behavior (e.g. changes in hours, e⁄ort, training) to measure
e¢ ciency costs. It is practical because tax records containing data on reported taxable income are
widely available.
The empirical literature on taxable income has generally found that elasticities are large for
the highest earners (top 1%), and relatively small for the rest of the income distribution (see e.g.,
Lindsey 1987, Slemrod 1998, Gruber and Saez 2002, Saez 2004). This ￿nding has led some to
suggest that reducing top marginal tax rates would generate substantial e¢ ciency gains.1
The taxable income reported by high income individuals is very sensitive to the tax rate partly
because of tax avoidance and evasion (Slemrod 1992, 1995).2 For example, individuals take com-
pensation in the form of untaxed fringe bene￿ts or use unmonitored o⁄shore accounts to under-
report taxable income. Does the e¢ ciency cost of taxation depend on whether the taxable income
elasticity is driven by avoidance or evasion rather than changes in labor supply? Existing studies
(e.g. Feldstein 1999, Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002, Saez 2004) suggest that the answer is no, as
long as there are no changes in tax revenue from other tax bases. For example, Slemrod and
Yitzhaki remark that ￿Feldstein￿ s (1999) claim about the central importance of the elasticity of
taxable income generalizes to avoidance and evasion.￿ 3 The intuition underlying this conclusion
is straightforward: an optimizing agent equates the marginal cost of sheltering $1 of income from
taxation with the net marginal cost of reducing earnings by $1, so the reason that reported taxable
income falls does not matter for e¢ ciency calculations.
1Academic examples include Gruber and Saez (2002) and Feldstein (2006). The Joint Economic Committee (2001)
has argued in favor of lowering top rates based on the taxable income evidence. See Goolsbee (1999) for a critique
of the empirical literature on taxable income.
2Income shifting can also occur intertemporally. When tax changes are anticipated, individuals appear to retime
income substantially (Goolsbee 2000). I abstract from such intertemporal e⁄ects, focusing on the question of how
to measure e¢ ciency costs using estimates of the long-run e⁄ect of taxes on behavior.
3Slemrod and Yitzhaki go on to emphasize that there are two critical assumptions underlying this claim that
deserve further attention: no corner solutions and no externalities. The present paper essentially develops a formula
for excess burden when the second assumption is violated. I discuss the connections between this paper and existing
work in more detail below.
1In this paper, I reevaluate the taxable income elasticity as a measure of deadweight loss in
the presence of evasion and avoidance (￿sheltering￿behaviors).4 Existing studies in the taxable
income literature typically model sheltering as having purely a resource cost, i.e. generating a loss
in economic output. However, the cost of sheltering could instead re￿ ect a transfer to another
agent in the economy. For instance, an individual may be deterred from tax evasion because of
the expected cost of being ￿ned by the tax authority or other agents in the private sector. An
executive may be deterred from taking compensation in the form of perks (e.g. a better o¢ ce or
company cars) because he is forced to share some of these bene￿ts with other employees.
The taxable income formula does not hold in the presence of such ￿transfer costs.￿ Indeed,
if tax avoidance has only transfer costs, it generates no e¢ ciency loss at all because it leads to a
reallocation of resources across agents rather than a reduction in total output. In this case, the
excess burden of taxation depends purely on the total earned income elasticity ￿that is, the e⁄ect
of taxes on ￿real￿labor supply choices that a⁄ect total earnings.
In the general case where sheltering entails both resource and transfer costs, I derive a simple
formula for excess burden that depends on a weighted average of the reported taxable income
and total earned income elasticities. The weight is proportional to the marginal resource cost of
sheltering. Intuitively, in the presence of transfer costs, the agent does not equate the marginal
social costs of sheltering and reducing labor supply. This wedge in marginal social costs makes
it necessary to distinguish evasion and avoidance responses from changes in labor supply in the
formula for excess burden. The formula developed here is una⁄ected by revenue o⁄sets through
other taxes and by variations in the speci￿cation of the agent￿ s choice problem. In this sense,
the formula generalizes Feldstein (1999) by providing a robust method of calculating excess burden
when the private and social costs of sheltering di⁄er.
The results in this paper have several precedents in the literature, notably in the work of Joel
Slemrod and co-authors. It is widely recognized that the calculation of excess burden is complicated
by revenue o⁄sets in the presence of multiple taxes (e.g. Slemrod 1998, Gordon and Slemrod 2002,
Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002, Auerbach and Hines 2002, Saez 2004). In addition, Slemrod (1995)
and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001, 2002) point out that ￿nes lead to a di⁄erence between the private
and social costs of evasion, creating an added term in marginal revenue that must be taken into
account when computing excess burden.
4The distinction between illegal evasion and legal avoidance is not critical for the analysis in this paper, so I use
the term ￿sheltering￿as a general description of all evasion and avoidance responses.
2This paper contributes to the taxable income literature in two ways. First, it shows how
transfers between agents within the private sector a⁄ect the calculation of excess burden. Existing
formulas that adjust for revenue o⁄sets (e.g. Slemrod 1998, Saez 2004) are not valid in the presence
of private transfers. Second, even ignoring within-private-sector transfers, the formula here o⁄ers
an alternative approach to measuring the excess burden of taxation in the presence of revenue o⁄sets
and ￿nes. The Slemrod and Saez formulas adjust Feldstein￿ s (1999) formula by adding terms for
the change in revenue from other taxes In contrast, the formula here depends only on behavioral
responses to the income tax coupled with an estimate of the marginal resource cost of sheltering.
This permits calculation of the excess burden of an income tax without fully characterizing its
complex interactions with other tax bases through evasion and avoidance responses.
The simplicity of the formula facilitates empirical implementation and yields a more precise
understanding of the extent to which sheltering leads to excess burden. For instance, in the
extreme case of pure transfer costs, the analysis shows that sheltering has zero e¢ ciency cost when
the added term mentioned by Slemrod and Yitzhaki is taken into account, completely severing the
link between the taxable income elasticity and excess burden. The Feldstein formula implicitly
assumes that the marginal resource cost of every evasion and avoidance response equals the marginal
tax rate (approximately 40% for high-income taxpayers in the U.S.). Illustrative calculations of
resource costs suggest that the deadweight losses caused by some sheltering behaviors could be an
order of magnitude smaller than 40 cents per dollar sheltered (see section 3). Hence, one cannot
conclude that the e¢ ciency cost of taxing high income individuals is large directly from the evidence
of large taxable income elasticities.
2 Measuring Excess Burden
This section presents formulas for the excess burden of a linear income tax under various assump-
tions about the costs of sheltering. As a reference, I ￿rst derive Feldstein￿ s (1999) formula in
a labor supply model without sheltering. Next, I consider a model where individuals can avoid
or evade taxes by paying a real resource cost. I then consider a model where sheltering has no
resource cost but entails transfers to another agent. Finally, I consider the general case where
sheltering has both resource and transfer costs. To simplify the exposition, I abstract from income
e⁄ects by assuming quasilinear utility in the main text; a model with curved utility is considered
in the appendix.
32.1 Benchmark Model: No Sheltering
Consider the canonical model of labor-leisure choice, where the individual chooses how many hours
to work (l) at a ￿xed wage rate w. Let t denote the tax rate on labor income, y unearned income,
c consumption, and  (l) the disutility of labor. The individual￿ s problem is to
max
l
u(c;l) = c ￿  (l)
s.t. c = y + (1 ￿ t)wl
As is standard in e¢ ciency cost calculations, the conceptual experiment I consider is to measure
the net dollar-value loss from raising the tax rate and giving the money back lump-sum to the
taxpayer. For this purpose, I de￿ne social welfare as the sum of the individual￿ s utility (which is
a money metric given quasilinearity) and tax revenue:
W(t) = fy + (1 ￿ t)wl(t) ￿  (l(t))g + twl
Since the individual has chosen l to maximize utility, the envelope condition implies that an increase
in t has only a mechanical ￿rst-order e⁄ect on the agent￿ s utility (i.e. @u
@t = ￿wl). Hence, behavioral
responses can be ignored when di⁄erentiating the term in the curly brackets, yielding the following
expression for the marginal excess burden of taxation:
dW
dt







where TLI = wl is taxable labor income. Feldstein (1999) proved that (1) holds even in a model
where individuals make a vector of labor supply decisions (l1,...,ln) such as hours, training, and the
type of job held. Thus, the taxable income elasticity (@TLI
@t ) is a ￿su¢ cient statistic￿to calculate
deadweight loss in a general multi-input labor supply model.
2.2 Sheltering with a Resource Cost
Now suppose the individual can shelter $e from taxation by paying a cost g(e). The sheltering
of $e could occur either through legal tax avoidance (e.g. setting up a trust) or illegal tax evasion
(e.g. under-reporting). The resource cost g(e) re￿ ects the economic opportunity cost of sheltering
4$e, i.e. the loss in total output from this activity. For example, g(e) could re￿ ect the loss in
pro￿ts from transacting in cash instead of electronic payments or the cost of choosing a distorted
consumption bundle to avoid taxes.
The individual chooses labor supply (l) and how much income to shelter (e) to
max
l;e
u(c;l;e) = c ￿  (l) ￿ g(e) (2)
s.t. c = y + (1 ￿ t)(wl ￿ e) + e
Social welfare is:5
W(t) = fy + (1 ￿ t)wl(t) ￿ e(t)) + e(t) ￿ g(e(t)) ￿  (l(t))g + t(wl ￿ e)
Since the individual has chosen both l and e optimally, we can again ignore behavioral responses
when di⁄erentiating the term in the curly brackets. Hence
dW
dt







where TLI = wl￿e is reported taxable income. Equation (3) shows that Feldstein￿ s (1999) formula
holds in this model. From an e¢ ciency perspective, it does not matter if taxable income falls with
t because of a change in labor supply (l) or a reporting e⁄ect (e). Intuitively, the agent optimally
sets the marginal cost of reporting $1 less to the tax authority (g0(e)) equal to the marginal private
value of doing so (t). Since the agent supplies labor up to the point where his marginal disutility
of earning another dollar equals 1 ￿ t, the marginal social value of earning an extra dollar (net
of disutility of labor) is t. Hence, the marginal social costs of reducing earnings and reporting
less income are exactly the same at the individual￿ s optimal allocation, making it irrelevant which
mechanism underlies the change in TLI for e¢ ciency. This is the intuition underlying studies
which argue that the taxable income elasticity is su¢ cient to calculate deadweight loss even in the
presence of evasion and avoidance.
5This speci￿cation of social welfare assumes that we give full weight to the utility of tax evaders. Some authors
(e.g. Sandmo 1981) point out that it may be more appropriate to give less weight to evaders in social welfare on
ethical grounds. The qualitative results below would be una⁄ected by di⁄erential weighting of e and wl in W.
52.3 Sheltering with a Transfer Cost
Part of the cost of sheltering may re￿ ect a transfer across agents. The leading example of such
transfer costs are ￿nes levied for tax evasion through audits. A ￿ne has a private cost to the tax
evader but has no social cost if the agent is risk neutral, because it simply redistributes output
from the agent to the government. If the agent is risk averse, the increased uncertainty created by
evasion and random audits constitutes a resource cost. To simplify the exposition, I analyze the
risk neutral case in the main text. In the appendix, I show that the general formula derived in
section 2.4 can be easily extended to the case with risk aversion with an appropriate rede￿nition
of g0(e) to include the loss of utility due to added risk.
I model audit deterrence of evasion using a simple variant of the framework developed by
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Suppose that an individual is audited with probability p(e), where
the probability of audit increases with e ￿egregious under-reporting may lead to a higher chance of
being caught. If caught, the individual must pay his tax bill and in addition a ￿ne F(e). Let the
expected cost of evading $e be denoted by z(e;t) = p(e)[te + F(e)]. In this subsection, I assume
that audits are costless and that evasion has no other real resource cost. In addition, assume
that z is a strictly convex function of e to guarantee an interior optimum in e. Aside from the
convexity assumption, the derivation that follows does not depend on the speci￿cation of z(e;t).
Hence, although I have given a micro-foundation for z(e;t) in terms of auditing for concreteness,
the results below apply for any transfer cost z, i.e. any cost of sheltering which has a positive
externality of equal size on another agent. I return to this point and discuss other examples of
such transfer costs in section 2.6.
The individual chooses e and l to
max
e;l
u(c;l;e) = c ￿  (l)
s.t. c = y + (1 ￿ t)(wl ￿ e) + e ￿ z(e;t)
This agent￿ s problem is formally identical to that in (2). However, there is a key di⁄erence in the
social welfare function, in which the z(e;t) transfer externality now appears twice (with opposite
signs):
W(t) = fy + (1 ￿ t)(wl ￿ e) + e ￿ z(e;t) ￿  (l(t))g + z(e;t) + t(wl ￿ e)
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Intuitively, the individual sets the marginal private bene￿t of raising e (saving $t) with the marginal







Equation (5) shows that in the transfer cost model, the taxable income elasticity is not a su¢ cient
statistic to calculate deadweight loss. Instead, excess burden is determined purely by the e⁄ect of
taxation on total earned income (@wl
@t ) ￿the e⁄ect of taxes on ￿real￿labor supply decisions.6 If the
only margin of behavior that a⁄ects total earned income is hours of work ￿as in the simple model
analyzed here ￿then @wl
@t corresponds to the traditional ￿labor supply elasticity￿used in the labor
economics literature. If there are multiple dimensions to labor supply decisions (e.g. training,
e⁄ort, etc.), the total earned income elasticity is an aggregate of all these behavioral responses.
If TLI responds to t only because of sheltering, there is no deadweight loss at all. Sheltering
does not lead to deadweight loss because the cost z(e;t) for the agent is exactly o⁄set by the positive
￿scal externality z(e;t) on government revenue. Intuitively, the total size of the pie is una⁄ected
by sheltering; the cost z simply a⁄ects how the pie is split. In contrast, in the resource cost model,
the cost of sheltering g(e) is pure waste.
6Slemrod (2001) proposes a model of evasion in which the expected ￿ne z depends on earnings (wl) as well as
the amount evaded (e). For example, earning a higher income could increase the probability of audit or reduce the
cost of hiding income. The qualitative results in this paper hold when
@z




@t , re￿ ecting the e⁄ect of earned income on the transfer cost. This is because the marginal disutility of labor
 




@t at the optimum, changing the social cost of distortions in labor supply.
72.4 General Case: Resource and Transfer Costs
Suppose that sheltering $e of income from taxation requires payment of both a resource cost g(e)
and a transfer cost z(e;t).7 The individual chooses e and l to maximize his utility net of both
resource and transfer costs:
max
e;l
u(c;l;e) = c ￿  (l) ￿ g(e)
s.t. c = y + (1 ￿ t)(wl ￿ e) + e ￿ z(e;t)
Social welfare is
W(t) = fy + (1 ￿ t)(wl ￿ e) + e ￿ z(e;t) ￿  (l(t)) ￿ g(e)g + z(e;t) + t(wl ￿ e)













The key di⁄erence relative to the pure transfer cost model is that the individual￿ s ￿rst order
condition now has an additional term re￿ ecting the marginal resource cost:
t = z0(e) + g0(e) (6)



















f￿"TLI;1￿t(wl ￿ e) + (1 ￿ ￿)"LI;1￿twlg (7)
where ￿ =
g0(e)
z0(e)+g0(e) denotes the fraction of the total cost of sheltering accounted for by resource
costs and "TLI;1￿t = ￿@TLI
@t
1￿t
TLI and "LI;1￿t = ￿@LI
@t
1￿t
wl denote the taxable income and total earned
income elasticities, respectively.
7The assumption that the agent incurs the resource cost is made simply to reduce notation. The formula for
excess burden is una⁄ected if the resource cost g(e) is incurred by the government instead of the agent, because the
social welfare function W(t) is unchanged. Hence, in empirical implementation, g(e) should be interpreted as the
total social resource cost. For example, if each audit costs $cA, the term p(e)cA should be included in g(e).
8When there is no transfer cost, ￿ = 1, and (7) reduces to the standard taxable income formula
in (3). At the other extreme, when there is no resource cost, ￿ = 0, and the formula reduces to
(5), which depends only on the earned income elasticity. In the general case where ￿ 2 (0;1), the
excess burden of income taxation is determined by a weighted average of the taxable income and
total earned income elasticities. The weight ￿ is determined by the relative importance of resource
and transfer costs in sheltering.
Why is it necessary to distinguish evasion and avoidance responses from changes in labor supply
to calculate excess burden when ￿ < 1? The optimizing agent still equates the marginal private
cost of sheltering $1 of income from taxation with the net marginal cost of reducing earnings by
$1. But the marginal social cost of sheltering di⁄ers from the private cost when ￿ < 1, breaking
the equality of marginal social costs condition that underlies Feldstein￿ s (1999) result.
It is easy to see that (7) would be una⁄ected by the introduction of additional choice variables
for the agent (multi-dimensional labor supply), since the envelope conditions would still hold.
Equation (7) therefore provides a relatively simple but robust method of calculating excess burden
in the presence of transfer and resource costs, much as Feldstein identi￿ed the taxable income
elasticity as a su¢ cient statistic in a model with only resource costs.
Equation (7) calls for a two-step procedure to calculate the e¢ ciency cost of taxation. First,
estimate the total earned income and taxable income elasticities.8 Second, estimate the marginal
resource cost g0(e) to calculate the weight ￿. If avoidance responses are much larger than ￿real￿
labor supply responses, as documented by Slemrod (1992, 1995), excess burden can be approximated
simply by multiplying existing estimates of the taxable income elasticity by an estimate of ￿. This
formula should be preferred to Feldstein￿ s (1999) formula especially when the resource cost of
sheltering could be small relative to the marginal tax rate (i.e. g0(e) << t).
2.5 Excess Burden vs. Optimal Taxation
It is important to recognize that the analysis above has di⁄erent implications for the measurement
of deadweight loss and the determination of optimal taxes. The taxable income elasticity is always
a necessary input for revenue and optimal tax calculations, irrespective of its relevance for excess
burden calculations. To see this, consider the following simple optimal tax problem. Suppose
that one dollar of government spending on public goods generates social bene￿ts of $1+￿, so that
8Total earned income can potentially be backed out from consumption data: see Pissarides and Weber (1989)
or Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) for examples. One can also implement (7) by estimating the e⁄ect of tax rates on
income shifting (
@e
@t), as in Clotfelter￿ s (1983) study of tax rates and tax evasion using audit data.
9social welfare is now
W(t) = fy + (1 ￿ t)(wl ￿ e) + e ￿ z(e;t) ￿  (l(t)) ￿ g(e)g + z(e;t) + t(wl ￿ e) + ￿t(wl ￿ e)










It follows that the tax rate t￿ that maximizes W(t) satis￿es:
t￿
1 ￿ t￿ =
￿TLI
￿"TLI;1￿tTLI + (1 ￿ ￿)"LI;1￿twlg + ￿TLI"TLI;1￿t
This equation shows that when sheltering entails a pure transfer cost (￿ = 0), t￿ is a function of
both "TLI;1￿t and "LI;1￿t, even though excess burden depends purely on "LI;1￿t. This is because
the relevant consideration for optimal tax design is the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) ￿
the marginal deadweight loss per dollar of marginal tax revenue. The taxable income elasticity
determines how much the tax rate must be raised to generate an additional dollar of tax revenue,
while the earned income elasticity determines the marginal e¢ ciency cost of that tax increase.
Since the denominator of the MCPF always depends on "TLI;1￿t, it is equally important to estimate
"TLI;1￿t and "LI;1￿t to analyze optimal taxation regardless of the weight ￿.
A related point is that even if sheltering has no e¢ ciency cost, it could still be desirable to
reduce sheltering from the perspective of optimal policy. Reducing tax evasion through sti⁄er
penalties could be a more e¢ cient way to generate revenue than raising other distortionary taxes
even if evasion has no resource cost. Again, the optimal policy problem involves additional elements
beyond the pure calculation of excess burden. A full characterization of optimal tax rates and
￿nes when sheltering entails transfer costs is an important problem left for future research.
2.6 Discussion: Transfer Costs
Fines for tax evasion are just one example of transfer costs. In general, transfer costs can be of
two types: transfers to the government (revenue o⁄sets) or to other agents in the private sector. I
now discuss some examples of these two types of transfers, and compare their implications for the
formula above as well as other formulas proposed in previous studies.
Government Transfer Costs. The leading example of a revenue o⁄set is the shifting of income
10between the personal income and corporate tax bases (Gordon and Slemrod 2002). If corporate
income is taxed at a rate tc, the agent e⁄ectively pays a transfer cost of z(e) = tce to the government
to shelter $e from income taxation through shifting. The formula in (7), which applies for arbitrary
z(e), o⁄ers one means of accounting for revenue o⁄sets. An alternative formula is given in Saez
(2004), who adjusts Feldstein￿ s (1999) formula by adding terms to marginal revenue that re￿ ect the
revenue raised from other taxes. Still another approach is to compare the mechanical change in










where R = t(wl ￿ e) + z(e) denotes total tax revenue from all tax bases (including ￿nes collected
from audits) and @R
@t jl;e denotes the change in tax revenue if l and e were unchanged. When the
only transfer costs of sheltering are associated with revenue o⁄sets, the three formulas are just
di⁄erent representations of the same equation, and should yield exactly the same estimate of excess
burden.
To implement Slemrod￿ s and Saez￿ s revenue-adjustment formulas, one must identify all the
behavioral responses through which total tax revenue is a⁄ected following an income tax change
￿that is, trace out how each change in behavior a⁄ects revenue from each component of the tax
system. Implementing (7) requires less data ￿ one must estimate only the taxable and total
income elasticities and the marginal revenue cost of sheltering. An additional advantage is that
the representation in (7) yields insight into the key determinants of excess burden: the deadweight
cost of sheltering is proportional to its resource cost, irrespective of its e⁄ects on other parts of the
government￿ s budget.9
Private-Sector Transfer Costs. Although the three formulas discussed above are all valid
methods of accounting for transfers to the government, only the formula proposed here accounts
for transfers within the private sector. There are many cases in which penalties for evasion and
avoidance are imposed by other agents in the private sector rather than the government. For
example, a manager may be ￿red by shareholders if he is discovered to use illegal tax sheltering
strategies, thereby losing a bonus. A ￿rm may lose clients to a competitor if it is identi￿ed as a tax
evader. An individual may risk losing part of his wealth to theft by holding it in the form of cash
or hidden accounts. Penalties that deter evasion could also deter quasi-legal avoidance strategies
9The drawback of the method proposed here is that one needs to estimate the average value of g
0(e), which may
be di¢ cult. See section 3 for a discussion on estimating g
0(e).
11￿e.g. declaring a vehicle or travel expense as a ￿business expense￿￿.since the border between
avoidance and evasion is often ambiguous.
Avoidance strategies that are clearly legal may also be partially deterred by private transfer
externalities. Suppose an executive is deciding whether to compensate himself in the form of a
taxed dollar of labor income or untaxed perks such as amenities in the o¢ ce (e.g. a better building,
child care facilities, better company cars). Such perks could entail two forms of transfer costs.
First, since an executive typically cannot take the perks with him to another job, some fraction of
the bene￿ts (in expectation) are transferred to subsequent executives. Second, some of the surplus
from the o¢ ce amenities may have to be shared with other employees even contemporaneously ￿
it is di¢ cult to improve only part of a building. Transfers within a family are another example:
if an individual values his children￿ s consumption at less than $1 but the planner weights all
individuals equally, the individual e⁄ectively incurs a transfer cost when sheltering money from
taxation through trusts or inter-vivos transfers.10
In all of these examples, the agent faces a cost of sheltering z(e) that accrues to another agent
in the private sector and does not a⁄ect social welfare. Since the derivation above holds with
arbitrary z(e), equation (5) is valid in all of these situations. In contrast, the revenue-adjustment
methods in Slemrod (1998) and Saez (2004) do not hold in this environment (see the appendix for
a proof). This is because within-private-sector externalities never show up on the government￿ s
budget, invalidating the approach of making adjustments based purely on government revenue.
It is important to note that the only private transfer externalities that a⁄ect the Feldstein
(1999) calculation are those which are not internalized by agents through Coasian bargaining. If
private externalities are internalized through Coasian bargaining, the private transfer term drops
out of z(e). For example, if a manager renegotiates his contract with others who are impacted
by his tax sheltering activities (shareholders, other employees, etc.), he e⁄ectively faces no private
transfer cost in sheltering because his salary can be adjusted to o⁄set any externalities. In practice,
transaction costs and information problems likely impede perfect contracting, and some sheltering
behaviors are therefore deterred by private transfer costs.
At an abstract level, it is not surprising that private and ￿scal transfers change Feldstein￿ s
formula, since non-pecuniary externalities always introduce additional terms in e¢ ciency calcula-
tions. Transfers are a subset of externalities where the positive externality on other agents comes
10Of course, each of these examples also involves some resource costs. For instance, e⁄ort spent on lobbying to
receive a transfer constitutes a resource cost.
12purely from a cost borne by the agent making the sheltering decision. Transfer externalities are of
special interest because they create a wedge between the marginal resource cost of sheltering and
the tax rate, potentially explaining why agents do not always shelter income to the point where
the marginal resource cost equals the tax bene￿t. A standard externality that does not impose a
cost on the agent who makes the sheltering decision does not lead to such a wedge. Because trans-
fer externalities have a private cost but no e⁄ect on social welfare, they lead to a simple formula
for excess burden that depends purely on the total earned income and taxable income elasticities.
Thus, while it is generally di¢ cult to account for externalities in excess burden calculations, one
important class of externalities ￿transfer costs associated with sheltering ￿can be handled using
the simple formula in (7).11
3 Conclusion: Measuring Resource Costs of Sheltering
This note has extended Feldstein￿ s (1999) taxable income elasticity formula to an environment in
which the private and social costs of sheltering di⁄er. The generalized formula shows that to
calculate excess burden, it is critical to determine (1) how much of the taxable income elasticity
is driven by variation in real labor supply choices vs. sheltering ("TLI;1￿t;"LI;1￿t); and (2) to
what extent sheltering entails resource costs vs. a transfer of resources between agents (￿). These
issues are particularly important in understanding the e¢ ciency cost of taxing individuals who have
substantial ability to shelter income, such as high-income earners and self-employed individuals.
The transfer vs. resource cost distinction also has implications for issues beyond the e¢ ciency
cost of income taxation. For example, Gruber and Rauh (2007) estimate the sensitivity of reported
corporate pro￿ts to corporate tax rates to calculate the excess burden of the corporate tax. If
corporations￿reported pro￿ts are sensitive to tax rates primarily because of reporting e⁄ects and
these changes in reporting do not entail substantial resource costs, the excess burden from corpo-
rate taxation may be smaller than implied by Gruber and Rauh￿ s calculations. Another example
is Looney and Singhal￿ s (2006) use of the taxable income measure to estimate intertemporal sub-
stitution elasticities using anticipated changes in tax rates. Although individuals may shift their
reported taxable income signi￿cantly across periods to minimize their tax burdens, labor supply
and total earnings could be less elastic intertemporally (Goolsbee 2000). Since aggregate output
11Other (non-transfer) externalities can be addressed using the standard method of adding terms to (7). I have
abstracted from non-transfer externalities to highlight the conditions under which the taxable income elasticity is or
is not informative about excess burden.
13is what matters in calibrating representative-agent macro models, one must quantify the extent to
which output is reduced by resource costs of intertemporal shifting in order to translate Looney
and Singhal￿ s estimates into the relevant intertemporal elasticity.
I conclude by discussing how the marginal resource cost of sheltering g0(e) can be quanti￿ed in
practice.12 This parameter can be measured by answering the question, ￿What is the loss in total
surplus from of an additional dollar of sheltering?￿ I provide simple calculations of average resource
costs for a few common sheltering behaviors, which yield a rough sense of marginal resource costs
under the assumption that the cost curves are not highly convex.
Some sheltering responses ￿especially evasion ￿are likely to have resource costs that are an
order of magnitude smaller than top marginal tax rates (roughly 40% in the U.S.). For example,
one common sheltering strategy is to conduct business transactions in cash and under-report net
pro￿ts.13 The resource cost of conducting business in cash can be approximated by the fee that
￿rms are willing to pay credit card companies (approximately 2-4% per transaction).14 Another
evasion strategy is to set up o⁄shore bank accounts to avoid double-reporting of income. A survey
of o⁄shore banks indicates that the average cost for setting up and maintaining a $1,000,000 balance
in a business or individual account is 0.2% of the assets invested.15 A common strategy for legal
tax avoidance is to set up a trust to shield bequests from estate and capital gains taxation. A
survey of estate tax planners indicates that the average cost for setting up a $1,000,000 trust is
roughly 2% of the assets invested.16 Although these calculations neglect other potential resource
costs such as greater risk and additional legal fees, they indicate that resource costs for certain
types of sheltering could be far smaller than top marginal tax rates.
At the other extreme, tax avoidance through distortion in consumption patterns is likely to
have a marginal resource cost equal to the marginal tax rate. Individuals who buy bigger houses,
over-consume healthcare, or ￿ y in ￿rst class simply to reduce their personal income tax burden
12Ideally, one should calculate both z
0(e) and g
0(e) to fully understand the costs of sheltering. However, it is
only necessary to calculate one of these to compute the weight ￿ since agent optimization implies g
0(e) + z
0(e) = t.
Calculating transfer costs is likely to be more di¢ cult than resource costs given private transfers.
13According to Internal Revenue Service (2006) estimates of the ￿tax gap￿ , of the $350 billion (15% of tax revenue)
in tax liabilities that were not paid in 2001, $290 billion was due to under-reporting of personal income taxes. Of
this, the majority is due to under-reporting of small business income.
14Enforcement costs add relatively little to the resource costs of evasion. According to the Internal Revenue Service
(2006), the government spent $6.63 billion on tax enforcement, relative to a base of about $350 billion in tax evasion.
15A graduate student and I compiled rates from seven banks o⁄ering o⁄shore banking services (either by phone or
using ￿gures quoted on websites). Our raw data are available upon request. The percentage cost is de￿ned as setup
charges plus the annual fee for maintaining a basic interest-earning account with a $1,000,000 balance.
16We compiled fees from six law ￿rms o⁄ering estate planning services. We de￿ned the cost as the total fees
charged for setting up a trust to pass money to descendants at lower tax rates.
14pay large resource costs to shelter income because of the distortions in their consumption bundles.
Other tax avoidance measures may have intermediate resource costs because they do not a⁄ect the
overall level of expenditures signi￿cantly ￿e.g. capital income payments instead of labor income or
claiming a car as a business expense ￿but still distort some attributes of the consumption bundle,
such as the location or timing of consumption.
The considerable uncertainty about the marginal resource cost of sheltering combined with
its central importance for tax policy suggests that estimating the mean value of this parameter
should be a high priority for future research. One promising empirical approach is to compare
the e⁄ects on tax changes on reported income and consumption bundles, recognizing that any real
resource costs must ultimately result in lower consumption.17 An interesting recent example of
such an analysis is Gorodnichenko et al. (2008), which shows that a large tax reform in 2001 in
Russia induced large changes in reported taxable income but little change in both the level and
composition of consumption. The ￿ndings imply that the resource costs of changes in reported
taxable income are small in the Russian case. Additional studies on the e⁄ects of tax reforms on
consumption would be valuable given the prevalence of evasion and avoidance even in the U.S.:
recent studies estimate that the evasion tax gap in the U.S. is 15% of tax revenue and that the
avoidance tax gap is also substantial (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002, Slemrod 2007).
17Consumption measures will not capture purely psychological costs, such as the cost of violating ethical principles
by evading taxes. Such costs could potentially be an important deterrent to sheltering, and understanding whether
they should be treated as real resource costs in welfare calculations is an interesting issue for future research.
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17Appendix: Extensions
I. Auditing model with a risk averse agent
Let the agent￿ s utility be denoted by u(c), which we assume is increasing and concave. In the
state where the agent successfully evades taxes and is not audited, his income is y+(1￿t)(wl￿e)+e,
where y represents unearned income. In the state where he is audited and caught, his income is
y + (1 ￿ t)wl ￿ F(e) where y denotes unearned income. Let V (t;y) denote the agent￿ s expected
utility as a function of the tax rate and unearned income and E(t;V ) denote the corresponding
expenditure function. Following Auerbach (1985), I de￿ne excess burden using the compensated
variation measure:
EB = E(t;V (0;y)) ￿ y ￿ R(t)
where R(t) = t(wlc(t) ￿ ec(t)) + p(ec(t))[tec(t) + F(ec(t))] is tax revenue and lc(t) and ec(t) are
income-compensated Hicksian demand functions. The objective is to derive an elasticity-based
expression for dEB
dt . To begin, observe that the agent￿ s indirect utility function is
V (t;y) = max
e;l
(1 ￿ p(e))u(y + (1 ￿ t)(wl ￿ e) + e) + p(e)u(y + (1 ￿ t)wl ￿ F(e)) ￿  (l)
The expenditure function is
E(t;V ) = min
e;l;￿
y + ￿(V ￿ (1 ￿ p(e))u(y + (1 ￿ t)(wl ￿ e) + e) ￿ p(e)u(y + (1 ￿ t)wl ￿ F(e)) +  (l))
where ￿ denotes the multiplier on the utility constraint. Let ch denote consumption in the ￿good￿
state (where the agent is not caught) and cl denote consumption is the state where he is caught
and Eu0(c) = (1 ￿ p(e))u0(ch) + p(e)u0(cl) denote the expected marginal utility of consumption.
Using the ￿rst order conditions from agent optimization, it is easy to see that ￿ = 1
Eu0(c). Note






f(1 ￿ p(e))u0(ch)(wl ￿ e) + p(e)u0(cl)wlg
dR
dt




















[(￿t + p0(e))(te + F) + p(e)(t + F0(e))]
To simplify the third term in this expression, consider the agent￿ s ￿rst order condition with respect



























18To clarify the intuition for this formula, I take a quadratic approximation to the utility function



























ch denotes the percentage loss in private income when the agent is caught. Note
that when ￿ = 0 (risk neutrality), the last two terms drop out of (8) and it coincides with (5) as
expected. The second term re￿ ects the cost of the additional risk directly from the increase in the
tax rate, which raises the di⁄erence in income between the two states in proportion to the amount
of tax evaded e. The third term re￿ ects the cost of the additional risk that the agent bears from
one dollar of additional evasion, due to the increased ￿ne and probability of audit. Both of these
additional risk costs constitute real resource costs because they reduce net social welfare.
De￿ning the marginal resource cost of evasion as g0(e) = fp(e)F0(e)￿c
c + 1
2p0(e)ch(￿c
c )2g and the
marginal resource cost directly from the increase in the tax rage as g0
t(e) = ￿fp(e)(1 ￿ p(e))e￿c
c g,






















TLI;1￿t denotes the compensated taxable income elasticity and "c
LI;1￿t denotes the compen-
sated total earned income elasticity. This equation coincides with the formula for the general case
with resource and transfer costs in (7) except for the additional term g0
t(e) re￿ ecting the direct cost
of subjecting the agent to increased risk when tax rates are high. Excess burden still depends
on a weighted average of the taxable income and total earned income elasticities, with the weight
proportional to the resource cost of evasion. Hence, the main result of the paper still holds in the
case of a risk-averse agent, provided that the marginal resource cost of evasion is de￿ned to include
the risk-bearing costs of evasion.
II. Revenue Adjustment Formula













@t jl;e is the ￿mechanical￿change in tax revenue (ignoring behavioral responses). This is
the classic ￿revenue adjustment￿formula discussed e.g. in Auerbach (1985) and Slemrod (1998).













To rewrite this formula using the revenue-adjustment strategy proposed by Slemrod, it is useful to
distinguish two cases.
1. Revenue o⁄set. Suppose z(e) accrues to the government, so that R = t(wl ￿ e) + z(e). Then
@R
@t jl;e = wl ￿ e while @R





@t. Hence the standard tax revenue distortion









2. Private transfer cost. Suppose z(e) is a private transfer to another agent in the economy. Then
@R
@t = wl ￿ e + t
@(wl￿e)














where the additional term re￿ ects the externality transfer within the private sector that occurs
through the agent￿ s behavioral response to the tax change. Hence, the revenue adjustment formula
does not hold with private transfers.
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